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I. INTRODUCTION
In late December 2019, Chinese health officials notified the World
Health Organization (WHO) of a new cluster of pneumonia cases in
Wuhan City, Hubei Province of China.1 Over the next several months,
this initial outbreak would transform into one of the most widespread
global pandemics of the past century. The cause of the pandemic was
identified as a new novel coronavirus, and the disease it causes was
termed COVID-19.2
As the disease continued to spread, governments and their agencies—including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
in the United States—attempted to put measures into place to slow
the spread of the highly contagious virus.3 One of the primary measures was to restrict and warn against large gatherings of people,
which could lead to higher transmission rates of the virus.4
By their very nature, sessions of Congress and state legislatures
involve large gatherings that run counter to guidance or restrictions
against large groups.5 The pandemic immediately prompted calls for
suspending sessions or implementing distancing protocols6 and natu1. Pneumonia of Unknown Cause–China, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 5, 2020),
https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumonia-of-unkown-causechina/en/ [https://perma.cc/27DH-QXDU].
2. See infra section II.A.
3. Guidance for Organizing Large Events and Gatherings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 20, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/
community/large-events/considerations-for-events-gatherings.html [https://
perma.cc/BL78-8SYS].
4. Id.; see, e.g., NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Directed Health Measure
Order 2020—LLHD-003 (June 1, 2020), https://dhhs.ne.gov/Archived%20DHMs/
LLHD-June%201st-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2E9-J82C] (restricting gatherings and other activities in Lancaster County, Nebraska).
5. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Senate To Return Under New Guidelines To Avoid Gatherings, Wear
Masks When Possible, NPR (May 1, 2020, 5:56 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/01/849318028/senate-to-return-under-newguidelines-to-avoid-gatherings-wear-masks-when-possib [https://perma.cc/YJ9QCSFN].
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rally led some to consider the proposition of allowing members to participate and vote remotely due to health and safety concerns.7
The U.S. House of Representatives took a step towards remote voting by allowing remote proxy voting by members but still does not allow for direct remote voting by electronic means.8 The resolution
allowing proxy voting did not permit it indefinitely, and the practice
has come under intense political scrutiny.9 Some Members of Congress, such as House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, have advocated for
an expansion of remote voting via an electronic system that would allow members “indisposed by pregnancy, serious illness or even a natural disaster” to participate remotely10 Others, such as House Minority
Leader Kevin McCarthy, have argued proxy voting undermines the
essential in-person nature of Congress and have vowed to fight
against renewing the resolution.11
Despite this opposition, the chamber should use the reauthorization requirement as an opportunity to expand remote voting to include
remote participation and voting by electronic means. Additionally,
while neither the U.S. Senate12 nor the Nebraska Legislature13 has
adopted provisions allowing members to cast votes remotely during
times of emergency, now is the appropriate time to do so. Part II of
this Article will provide relevant background information on the
COVID-19 outbreak. Parts III and IV seek to address any potential
constitutional barriers and offer solutions for remote voting at the national level. Part V will evaluate the constitutionality of remote voting
in the Nebraska Legislature. This Article will demonstrate that while
there may be practical hurdles to overcome in order to implement remote legislative voting, neither the U.S. Constitution14 nor the Constitution of the State of Nebraska15 provide any detrimental barriers.
7. See infra section III.A.
8. See generally James P. McGovern, Dear Colleague: Resolution Introduced To Ensure Congress Can Continue Its Work During the Coronavirus Pandemic, HOUSE
COMM. ON RULES (May 13, 2020), https://rules.house.gov/news/announcement/
dear-colleague-resolution-introduced-ensure-congress-can-continue-its-work-during [https://perma.cc/L6MX-URXZ] (noting the resolution does not allow for using
technology to cast votes remotely).
9. See Nicholas Fandos, Born of a Crisis, Remote Voting in Congress Has Become a
Useful Perk, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/18/us/
politics/congress-remote-voting.html?referringSource=ArticleShare [https://
perma.cc/PFR6-SK2G] (further noting a primary criticism against remoting voting is a perceived abuse of the system).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra section V.A.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra section V.B.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

A Brief History of the COVID-19 Outbreak and Its Effects

WHO leaders were initially notified of a pneumonia outbreak of
unknown origin on December 31, 2019.16 As of January 3, 2020, there
were forty-four hospitalized patients, with eleven reported as being
severely ill.17 An undisclosed number of the patients were either dealers or vendors at the Hunan Seafood market in Wuhan, which authorities closed for sanitation and disinfection on January 1.18 The WHO
initially noted the link to the wholesale fish and live animal market
could indicate an exposure link to animals.19 On January 7, 2020, Chinese officials identified and isolated a new type of novel coronavirus
(nCoV)20 as the cause of the outbreak.21 China shared the genetic sequence of the new virus with the WHO on January 12.22 On February
11, the WHO announced that the subsequent respiratory illness nCoV
causes would be known as COVID-19.23
By the end of January 2020, the virus had spread considerably
throughout China, and confirmed cases were beginning to emerge
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Pneumonia of Unknown Cause–China, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
“There are hundreds of coronaviruses, most of which circulate among animals
such as pigs, camels, bats and cats. Sometimes those viruses jump to humans—
called a spillover event—and can cause disease.” Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Coronaviruses, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/
diseases-conditions/coronaviruses [https://perma.cc/22WW-ZGJK] (last visited
Sept. 20, 2020). There are seven known coronaviruses that sicken humans; four
cause mild to moderate illness and three can cause more serious to fatal disease.
Id.
SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) emerged in November 2002 and caused
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). That virus disappeared by
2004. Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is caused by the MERS
coronavirus (MERS-CoV). Transmitted from an animal reservoir in camels, MERS was identified in September 2012 and continues to cause sporadic and localized outbreaks. The third novel coronavirus to emerge in
this century is called SARS-CoV-2. It causes coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19), which emerged from China in December 2019 and was declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organization on March
11, 2020.
Id.
21. See Novel Coronavirus-China, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 12, 2020), https://
www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2020-DON233 [https://
perma.cc/NS24-TLMX] (“Other respiratory pathogens such as influenza, avian
influenza, adenovirus, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (SARSCoV), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) were ruled
out as the cause.”).
22. Id.
23. Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 29, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline [https://perma.cc/Q3422228].
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around the globe.24 At the end of January, China reported 7,736 confirmed cases and suspected 12,000 more, and another eighty-two cases
were confirmed across eighteen other countries25 including the United
States, where the first case was confirmed on January 22 in Washington State.26 On January 31, the WHO declared a public health emergency for just the sixth time, and the Trump administration declared
a public health emergency in the United States on February 3.27
On March 11, 2020, the WHO declared COVID-19 a global pandemic, with WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus calling for
countries to take “urgent and aggressive action. We have rung the
alarm bell loud and clear.”28 President Donald Trump soon officially
declared a national emergency in the United States on March 13, unlocking new sources of federal assistance to help battle the virus.29
Both the health and economic consequences of the pandemic were
profound. By the time the WHO finally declared COVID-19 to be a
pandemic in March, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had shed
twenty percent of its previous record high, set just a month earlier.30
Major events such as the National Collegiate Athletic Association basketball tournaments,31 the National Basketball Association season,
24. Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report – 10, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan.
30, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200130-sitrep-10-ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=D0b2e480_2 [https://perma.cc/FJC3M5J3].
25. Id. (India, Finland, and the Philippines were among the first countries to confirm
additional cases, all in persons that had a history of travel to Wuhan City).
26. Jennifer Harcourt et al., Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 from
Patient with Coronavirus Disease, United States, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS1266, 1268 (2020), https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2606.200516 [https://
EASES
perma.cc/5XJV-RLQ4] (noting that the case-patient acquired the virus during
travel to China).
27. A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (July 3,
2020), https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020
[https://perma.cc/GY4T-GD7D].
28. Jamey Keaten et al., WHO Declares Coronavirus a Pandemic, Urges Aggressive
Action, AP NEWS (Mar. 11, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/united-nationsmichael-pence-religion-travel-virus-outbreak-52e12ca90c55b6e0c398d134
a2cc286e#:~:text=GENEVA%20(AP)%20%E2%80%94%20The%20World,counter
parts%20in%20banning%20large%20gatherings [https://perma.cc/9US5-VQTW].
29. Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020) (“As of March 12,
2020, 1,645 people from 47 States have been infected with the virus that causes
COVID–19.”); see also COVID-19 Roundup: Coronavirus Now a National Emergency, with Plans To Increase Testing, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.ajmc.com/view/covid19-roundup2 [https://perma.cc/G58H-U9CM]
(explaining that the declaration invoked the Stafford Act, which allowed for financial and physical assistance through the Federal Emergency Management
Agency).
30. Keaten, supra note 28. As an example, the Dow dropped 1,464 points on March
11, 2020, putting it into a “bear market.” Id.
31. Laurel Wamsley, No March Madness: NCAA Cancels Men’s and Women’s Basketball Tournaments, NPR (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/12/81511
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and presidential campaign rallies were cancelled in an effort to control
the spread of the virus through large gatherings.32 States and local
governments began imposing restrictions on access to businesses such
as dine-in restaurants, theaters, and other non-essential businesses,
while others voluntarily closed their offices. Overall, authorities urged
Americans to stay home as much as possible and self-quarantine for at
least fourteen days after exposure to the virus33 to protect essential
workers and the general public. Unsurprisingly, the economic downturn, event cancellations, and restrictions on gatherings and non-essential businesses led to a significant rise in unemployment.34
The national unemployment rate in April 2020 rose to 14.7%—a
surge of 10.3 percentage points from the previous month—with nonfarm payroll employment falling by 20.5 million jobs.35 The 14.7% unemployment rate represented both the highest rate and the largest
over-the-month increase in the history of available data dating to January 1948.36 The sharp increase in rates was attributed to the
COVID-19 pandemic and efforts to contain it.37
B.

The Legislative Response to the Outbreak

Congress took action to attempt to address the health, safety, and
economic impacts of COVID-19. At the national level, on March 27,
2020, President Trump signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security (CARES) Act, which provided stimulus payments to individuals, expanded unemployment coverage, supported
employers by way of paycheck protection loans, suspended student
loan payments, temporarily lifted penalties for early withdrawal from
retirement accounts, and more.38 The total cost of the package was

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.

5557/no-march-madness-ncaa-cancels-mens-and-women-s-basketball-tournaments [https://perma.cc/W7VZ-LESZ] (noting the NCAA basketball tournaments
were officially cancelled).
Keaten, supra note 28.
COVID-19: Impact on Employment and Labor, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 13, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/
covid-19-impact-on-employment-and-labor.aspx [https://perma.cc/E95Z-2U77].
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-20-0815, EMPLOYMENT SITUATION NEWS RELEASE
(2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_05082020.htm [https://
perma.cc/L622-ZBMQ].
Id. “In April, unemployment rates rose sharply among all major worker groups.
The rate was 13.0 percent for adult men, 15.5 percent for adult women, 31.9 percent for teenagers, 14.2 percent for Whites, 16.7 percent for Blacks, 14.5 percent
for Asians, and 18.9 percent for Hispanics.” Id. The number of people “who reported being on temporary layoff increased about ten-fold to 18.1 million in
April.” Id.
Id.
Tara Siegel Bernard & Ron Lieber, F.A.Q. on Stimulus Checks, Unemployment,
and the Coronavirus Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
article/coronavirus-stimulus-package-questions-answers.html [https://perma.cc/
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estimated at $2 trillion.39 State governments were also active in passing emergency appropriations for COVID-19 relief efforts.40
While legislatures at the national and state levels took take action,
larger questions remained about the potential dangers of meeting in
groups—including legislative sessions—in the wake of the outbreak.41
Naturally, these questions contemplated the necessity of in-person
legislative action, which led to conversations about the possibility of
allowing members to participate and vote remotely during periods of
national emergency, including during the COVID-19 outbreak.42
III. FEDERAL LEVEL: THERE ARE NO CONSTITUTIONAL
BARRIERS TO REMOTE VOTING IN CONGRESS
A.

Members of Congress Lobby for Remote Voting in
Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak

In a letter to Chairman of the House Rules Committee James P.
McGovern on March 23, 2020, over sixty-five members of Congress
urged the Committee to enact a change to the House Rules to allow for
remote voting by members during national emergencies, including the
COVID-19 pandemic.43 The letter, authored in part by Representative
Eric Swalwell, noted:
By their very nature, national emergencies threaten the health and safety of
the American people and require quick action by Congress. COVID-19 is upsetting the expectations and experiences of people across the country. . . . Helping families who may be suffering from drastically negative
health and financial consequences is of paramount importance.
With COVID-19, and likely during any national emergency, that assistance
must be provided with as much speed as Congress can muster. Unfortunately,
during such circumstances, requiring Members to vote in person may pose
public health risks or even be physically impossible for persons under quarantine. We need to provide a mechanism through which Congress can act during
times of crisis without having to assemble in one place.44

The letter advocated for the temporary use of remote voting, noting
that millions of American businesses were already utilizing remote

39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

5BBJ-JYJS]; see Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
Bernard & Lieber, supra note 38.
See, e.g., Martha Stoddard, Nebraska Legislature to Reconvene Monday, One Senator Calls Virtual Meeting, SCOTTSBLUFF STAR-HERALD (Mar. 22, 2020), https://
starherald.com/news/regional_statewide/nebraska-legislature-to-reconvene-monday-one-senator-calls-virtual-meeting/article_45fe8e1d-ecb3-538c-aa3c-0282b
97d4a98.html [https://perma.cc/4UQB-B2SW].
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See infra section III.A.
Letter from Rep. Eric Swalwell et al. to James P. McGovern, Chairman, Comm.
on Rules (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000171-084e-d8c8a7f3-daff8a7a0000 [https://perma.cc/XG2N-849F].
Id. at 1.
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technology at that time due to the pandemic and that Congress should
similarly adapt.45
B.

Congress’s Rulemaking Power in the Context of Remote
Voting

It has long been understood that no matter how dire the situation
may be, an emergency on its own does not create new powers for the
government.46 Chief Justice Hughes, writing on the constitutionality
of a Minnesota statute challenged as an unconstitutional violation of
the Contract Clause,47 noted: “The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the Federal Government and its limitations of the power of the States were determined in
the light of emergency and they are not altered by emergency.”48
Hughes continued: “While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power. ‘Although an
emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living
power already enjoyed.’ ”49 Therefore, the threshold question in the remote voting inquiry is: Does the Constitution provide Congress with
the power to make such a decision?
The principle that Congress may conduct business remotely, specifically using a virtual voting system, is constitutionally untested.50
Broadly speaking, the Constitution provides each chamber the power
to determine its own rules of proceedings, commonly known as the
Rulemaking Power.51 The power has but one limitation. In United
45. Id.
46. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425–26 (1934).
47. Id. at 415–16, 447–48. The appellant in the case alleged the statute—the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law—violated the Constitution’s Contract Clause,
and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 415–16. The Act provided that during an emergency, relief may be
had through the courts with respect to foreclosures, execution sales of real estate,
and such sales may be postponed, and periods of redemption may be extended. Id.
at 416–18. The statute was enacted in response to the national and worldwide
business and financial crises during the 1930s. Id. at 422–23. The Court held the
statute as applied did not violate the Contract Clause of the Constitution, nor did
it deny the appellant’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 447–48.
48. Id. at 425.
49. Id. at 426 (quoting Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917)).
50. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON RULES, 116TH CONG., REP. EXAMINING VOTING
OPTIONS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 11 (2020), https://rules.house.gov/
sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/StaffReport_VotingOptions.pdf#page=13
[https://perma.cc/U9RF-9MB2] (compiled by majority staff and not officially
adopted by the Committee on Rules).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member.”).
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States v. Ballin, the Supreme Court held that Congress may not “ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained.”52 The Court also held that the power to make a rule is not
one which is exhausted once it has been exercised, but rather one
which can be continuously exercised by a house.53 The Court gave
Congress wide authority and discretion to make its own rules, holding
that “within the limitations suggested, [the authority is] absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.”54
Considering the Court’s holding in Ballin, the pertinent inquiries
must be whether remote voting violates any constitutional restraints
or fundamental rights and whether it is reasonably calculated to
achieve the desired result.55
C.

The Political Question Doctrine Would Likely Lead the
Court To Reject a Challenge to the Rulemaking
Power

Since the time Ballin was decided, several courts have rejected
challenges to congressional rulemaking power on the grounds that
they present nonjusticiable political questions.56 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority in Baker v. Carr, laid out the contours of the
so-called political question doctrine by identifying six circumstances
under which an issue might present a nonjusticiable political question: (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department;” (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;” (3) “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion;” (4) “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;” (5) “an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or”
(6) “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce52. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also Common Cause v. Biden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 9, 30 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding
that a challenge to the Senate’s cloture rules presented a nonjusticiable political
question).
55. See infra section III.D.
56. The political question doctrine was not well established at the time Ballin was
decided. See generally TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10447, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF REMOTE VOTING IN CONGRESS 4 (2020) (noting doctrines such as political question, enrolled bill rule, and equitable discretion could
conceivably limit judicial review).
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ments by various departments on one question.”57 The presence of any
one of these factors could indicate a nonjusticiable political question.58
In Common Cause v. Biden, a district court rejected a rulemaking
power challenge to the Senate’s cloture rules on political question
grounds.59 The court began its analysis by reaffirming the textual,
constitutional commitment of the rulemaking power to Congress and
reaffirming that for the court to hear the case, the plaintiffs would
need to point specifically to a constitutional provision that expressly
limited the authority to make the specific rule.60 The court refused to
apply the analysis employed in Powell v. McCormack, in which the
Supreme Court held justiciable a challenge to the House’s power to
judge the qualifications of its members.61 Instead, the court likened
the case to Nixon v. United States,62 in which the Supreme Court
found a nonjusticiable political question on the issue that the power to
try impeachments—including the form of such trials—was textually
committed to the Senate.63
The district court rejected Common Cause’s arguments, finding it
could not identify any constitutional provision that expressly limited
the Senate’s rulemaking power, nor did the culture rules violate any
fundamental rights.64 Common Cause attempted to present the Quorum Clause, Presentment Clause, and presence of some provisions requiring supermajority votes as textual restraints on the Senate’s
ability to make cloture rules, but the court held none of the provisions
“expressly limits the Senate’s power to determine its rules, including
when and how debate is brought to a close.”65 The court drew an important distinction between a rule conflicting with a constitutional
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

62.

63.
64.
65.

369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
Id. at 217–18.
Common Cause, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 29–30.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 28; see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547–50 (1969). In Powell, the
Court held the plaintiff’s challenge to his exclusion from the U.S. House of Representatives was justiciable because the House’s power to “be the Judge of the
Qualifications of its own Members,” was expressly limited by Article I, Section 2,
Clause 2, which sets forth the three textual criteria for membership (age, residency, and citizenship). Id. at 521 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5).
506 U.S. 224 (1993). In Nixon, a federal judge challenged his removal by the Senate, alleging that Senate Rule XI—which governs impeachment trials—was unconstitutional because it permitted the Senate to appoint a committee to receive
evidence and take testimony. Id. at 227–28. Nixon appealed on the grounds that
only the whole Senate—not just a committee—was given the power to impeach a
federal judge. Id. at 228. In finding the question to be nonjusticiable, the Court
concluded: “In the case before us, there is no separate provision of the Constitution that could be defeated by allowing the Senate final authority to determine
the meaning of the word ‘try’ in the Impeachment Trial Clause.” Id. at 237.
Common Cause, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
Id.
Id. at 28–29.
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provision and a provision that “expressly limits the Senate’s power to
determine” its rules, with the latter triggering a potential justiciable
question.66 The distinction made in Common Cause set the bar quite
high for a court to even hear a challenge to the rulemaking power on
constitutional grounds.
The court concluded there were no judicially discoverable and manageable standards by which to judge the rule,67 and that in order for
the court to reach the merits of the case it would “require an invasion
into internal Senate processes at the heart of the Senate’s constitutional prerogatives as a House of Congress, and would thus express a
lack of respect for the Senate as a coordinate branch of government.”68
The court noted several instances in which the Supreme Court had
found justiciable questions related to the rulemaking power, but all of
those instances involved either (1) Congress having violated its own
rule, or (2) the Court rejecting a statutory provision that violated the
explicit text of the Constitution.69 In none of the cited instances did
the Court find an actual rule unconstitutional.70
Much of the same discussion would apply to a congressional rule
regarding remote voting. As described in Common Cause, there is a
strong textual commitment to delegating rulemaking power to Congress.71 In scouring the text of the Constitution, there are only a few
provisions that may raise questions. The first two, Article I, Section
472 and the Twentieth Amendment,73 both require Congress to assemble at least once every year. Yet, even if the Court were to interpret
“assemble” to mean in person, the provisions only require one such
meeting. Applying the analysis in Common Cause, while a court may
interpret assemble to conflict with a rule allowing for remote voting, it
is hard to imagine a court finding the constitutional yearly assembly
66. Id. at 29 & n.14.
67. Id. at 30 (“Here, Plaintiffs point to no standard within the Constitution by which
the Court could judge whether or not the Cloture Rule is constitutionally valid.”).
68. Id. at 31.
69. Id. at 29–30; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941–42 (1983) (finding a statute violated the express text of the constitution); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S.
109, 114 (1963) (recognizing congressional rules are judicially cognizable in finding a committee violated its own rules); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84,
88–89 (1949) (finding that the relevant question was what the House rules were
and whether the committee actually followed them).
70. Common Cause, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
71. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
Year and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they
shall by Law appoint a different Day.”).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they
shall by law appoint a different day.”).
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standard as expressly limiting Congress’s power to make their own
rules regarding voting.74
Another provision, Article I, Section 5, allows Congress to compel
the “Attendance of absent Members,”75 and prohibits Congress from
adjourning to “any other Place than that in which the two Houses
shall be sitting.”76 Much of the same analysis applies to the attendance provision. The Constitution does not define attendance, and even
if the attendance provision somehow conflicts with the rulemaking
power, it does not seem to expressly limit it in the context of remote
voting. The Adjournments Clause may appear to have a larger impact,
as it imposes geographic limits on where a house can adjourn to, but it
is inapplicable in the context of remote voting because Congress would
not actually be adjourning. It would be in session, allowing members
to place votes from elsewhere. The quorum requirement, discussed below in section II.C, arguably supplies the strongest argument that the
Constitution expressly limits Congress’s power to promulgate remote
voting rules.
Absent an express provision limiting congressional power, there
still remains two additional issues under the political question framework that may prevent the Court from finding a justiciable question:
Are there judicially discoverable standards within the Constitution by
which to judge the rule, and would hearing a challenge to the rule
express a lack of respect for a different branch of government?77 Admittedly, the first of these two issues does not seem to present the
same issue as in Common Cause. The Court could conceivably use “assemble” as a standard that contemplates an in-person gathering, but
doing so would require embarking on an analysis of the kind the Court
rejected in Nixon.78 The second provision, invading another branch of
government in the context of remote voting, appears to be squarely the
kind of concern addressed in Common Cause.
The inevitable conclusion is that the Court would refuse to hear a
challenge to Congress’s rulemaking power in the remote voting context on political question grounds. The next section explores what
could happen if the Court viewed the quorum requirement as an express limitation on the power to adopt rules for voting outside the
Capitol Building.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 4.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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The Quorum Requirement as a Potential Express
Limitation to Congress’s Rulemaking Power in the
Remote Voting Context

Suppose for a moment the Court did decide the quorum requirement put an express limitation on Congress’s rulemaking power for
this purpose, or if the Court decided to ignore the political question
doctrine entirely and embark on an analysis based on the framework
laid out in Ballin itself. Ballin is significant in the remote voting context not just for its holding regarding the constitutional rulemaking
authority of Congress, but also because it directly addresses a challenge to the Constitution’s quorum requirement.79 The requirement
provides that a majority of each house “shall constitute a Quorum to
do Business,” but does not provide for how the quorum should be
counted.80 The pertinent rule in Ballin allowed for members that were
present in the chamber but not voting to be counted when determining
whether the quorum requirement was met.81
The Ballin Court held that, because the Constitution did not specify the method for determining the presence of a quorum, it was
“within the competency of the house to prescribe any method which
shall be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact.”82 At the time the
case was considered, the Court pondered three primary methods of
ascertaining the presence of a quorum: a roll call; the “passage of
members between tellers, and their count as the sole test; or the count
of the Speaker or the clerk, and an announcement from the desk of the
names of those who are present.”83 The Court concluded that any of
these methods was reasonably certain to ascertain whether a quorum
was present, and the Houses may adopt any or all of them to do so.84
A surface-level reading of Ballin does not seem to present a quorum-related constitutional hurdle to Congress adopting rules for re79. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
80. Article 1, Section 5 states:
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day,
and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in
such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
81. Ballin, 144 U.S. at 5. The exact rule was:
On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the
names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the house
who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal,
and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and
be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to
do business.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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mote voting. The Houses of Congress are given broad authority to
make their own rules, and so long as whatever means they choose is
“reasonably certain to ascertain”85 the presence of a quorum, the requirement should be satisfied.
That, of course, may not be the end of the inquiry. The Court in
Ballin held that “[a]ll that the Constitution requires is the presence of
a majority, and when that majority are present the power of the house
arises.”86 In the context of Ballin (decided in 1892), the Court contemplated two types of physical presence and its holding turned on
whether the Constitution allowed a non-voting member to count toward the requisite quorum.87 In other words, the means of counting
members was at issue.88 In 1892, the concept of presence obviously did
not contemplate any kind of virtual presence. If the Court declined to
apply the political question doctrine and instead conducted an analysis based on the rule from Ballin, it would arrive at the same conclusion, regardless of the interpretation used.
While the meaning of presence as it is used in the constitutional
quorum requirement has never been directly challenged, various
courts have wrestled with the concept in other settings. In Braniff Airways Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia took up the meaning of presence for
purposes of a quorum in the administrative agency setting.89 In Braniff, the court considered whether the quorum requirements for a board
decision under the Federal Aviation Act were met, and concluded that
the “quorum acting on a matter need not be physically present together at any particular time to ponder the evidence.”90 The court reasoned that such a finding allowed the review board to proceed with its
members acting separately in their offices, a similar process used by
the court itself for processing motions and considering petitions for
rehearing cases en banc.91 Such a process allowed for increased efficiency by the administrative board.92
The Supreme Court has also taken a seemingly different approach
on occasion. In Christoffel v. United States, the Court considered
whether House rules required a quorum of the Committee of Education and Labor to be “actually and physically” present when a defen85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 6.
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Id. at 460 (emphasis added); see Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1321(c)
(1964) (repealed 1978) (“Three of the members shall constitute a quorum of the
board.”).
91. Braniff Airways, Inc., 379 F.2d at 460.
92. Id. (noting that such a process was “a reasonable way for the Board to proceed in
dealing with its not inconsiderable work load”).
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dant allegedly committed perjury.93 Although fourteen of the
Committee’s twenty-five members were present for the roll call, the
defendant made the allegedly perjurious statements when there were
as few as six members physically present.94 The defendant’s objection
rested largely on the question of whether under House rules a committee was considered a competent tribunal within the meaning of the
criminal perjury statute without a quorum present at the time the
statements in question were made.95 The Court’s analysis of committee rules did not rest on the Constitution’s quorum requirement but
rather on the interpretation of the specific rules adopted by the House
itself.96 The rule in question at the time, House Rule XV, allowed for a
call of the House, and if a quorum was not present, the only business
that could be conducted was a motion to adjourn.97 The rule was applied to the committees by House Rule XI(2)(f).98
The Court in Christoffel reversed the defendant’s conviction on the
grounds that the lower court erred in instructing the jury to find a
competent tribunal where less than a quorum of members were actually and physically present at the time the statements were made.99
The Court made a point to mention that “[c]ongressional practice in
the transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course none of our
concern,” and that their sole purpose was to decide what rules the
House had established and whether they were followed.100
Although on its face Christoffel would seem to negatively impact
the prospects for remote voting by finding that a quorum of members
must be actually and physically present, nothing in the holding would
seem to impact whether the House could change their rules to accomplish those ends. In fact, the Court explicitly recognized the power of
the House to determine its own rules under the Constitution,101 and
93. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 86 (1949).
94. Id. at 85–86.
95. Id.; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2402(a)(1) (West 2013) (Perjury is defined as:
“[h]aving taken an oath or affirmation before a competent tribunal, officer, or
person, in a case in which the law authorized such oath or affirmation to be administered, that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any
written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by that person subscribed is true, wilfully and contrary to an oath or affirmation states or subscribes any material matter which he or she does not believe to be true and which
in fact is not true.”). The defendant’s main argument was that a House committee, consisting of less than a quorum, did not constitute a “competent tribunal”
under the meaning of the statute. Christoffel, 338 U.S. at 85–86.
96. Christoffel, 338 U.S. at 87.
97. Id.
98. Id. (noting that House Rule XI(2)(f) stated, in relevant part: “The rules of the
House are hereby made the rules of its standing committees so far as
applicable”).
99. Id. at 89–90.
100. Id. at 88–89.
101. Id. at 87.
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the holding in Christoffel turned entirely on the specific rules the
House had in fact adopted.
The Supreme Court took yet another different position on a quorum requirement in New Process Steel v. NLRB, holding that in a
multi-member government board setting, the statutory quorum requirement was only met if the number of participating members met
the required threshold.102 In New Process Steel, the National Labor
Relations Board had only two members remaining of the five that constituted a full membership.103 The board’s quorum requirements specified that three members of the board would constitute a quorum,
except in instances where the full board delegated to any group of
three or more members the powers which the full board could exercise—in which case any two members of the delegation would constitute a quorum.104 The court interpreted the statute to require the
board’s overall powers to be vested at all times in at least three members, which was “consonant with the Board quorum requirement,
which requires three participating members ‘at all times’ for the
Board to act.”105
Again, nothing in New Process Steel appears to be inconsistent
with remote voting principles. The Court was interpreting a statute,
the Taft-Hartley Act,106 and not the Constitution’s quorum requirement. The Court also only required participation to fulfill the quorum
requirements of the statute—literally whether there were enough
bodies on the board to meet the requirements—and did not specify
whether such participation had to be in person or could be accomplished by other means.
The prospect of remote voting also finds support in the underlying
purposes for the quorum requirement, as expressed by the framers at
the Constitutional Convention.107 Specifically, the framers articulated
102. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 680 (2010).
103. Id. at 678.
104. Id. at 679. The Court cites 29 U.S.C. § 153(b), which provides:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. . . . A vacancy
in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to
exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board
shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two
members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to
the first sentence hereof.
105. Id. at 680 (emphasis added); see also id. at 683–84 (posing a series of definitions
of quorum, eventually defining it as “the number of members of a larger body that
must participate for the valid transaction of business”).
106. See id. at 676.
107. James Madison, Madison Debates: August 10, in THE AVALON PROJECT: NOTES ON
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (Gaillard Hund & James Brown Scott eds.,
1920), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_810.asp [https://
perma.cc/Q4EB-AM47]; see also GARVEY, supra note 56, at 4 (describing two underlying concerns of the framers that remote voting would potentially address).
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two fears regarding the quorum requirement, and remote voting addresses both. First, the framers expressed the sentiment that the quorum for each house should be set at less than the majority to avoid
excessive interruptions of congressional action and to stave off anticipated inconvenience as the numbers of legislators increased.108 On
the other hand, the framers worried that allowing for less than a majority quorum could give advantages to “Central States” located within
a reasonable distance, which made it easier to travel to the seat of
government.109
At the core, the framers’ quorum debate centers on access to the
legislative process. Physical presence is only implicated because it was
the sole means of legislative participation at the time, so debate necessarily centered on how barriers to physical presence might improperly
impede or skew legislation. Remote voting assuages these fears by
eliminating the problems with or limitations on access created when
physical presence is required.110 If the framers considered less than a
majority to constitute a quorum to avoid inconvenience or delay in enacting legislation, the same logic supports the prospect of remote participation and voting, which would help to remedy this problem in the
event of a national emergency preventing members of Congress from
returning to Washington D.C. Remote voting would naturally be less
inconvenient and more timely in the event members were unable to
travel. Second, allowing for remote participation and voting would
eliminate the risk that favorably located states would have a disproportionate influence in legislative matters in times of emergency. Of
course, this risk is lower in 2020 than it was in the late 1700s, yet it is
still not difficult to imagine a situation where members of Congress
from nearby states could simply hop in their cars and drive to Washington D.C., while members from outlying states may be forced to rely
on civilian air transportation that may be more readily disrupted during a national emergency. The prospect of remote voting would mitigate the potential harm in these instances.
All considered, even if the Court endeavored to determine what the
quorum requirement actually contemplated using precedent as a
guide, there is nothing apparent in the Court’s history that would suggest a complete bar to a rule authorizing remote voting. The most
108. Madison, supra note 107.
109. Id. Framer George Mason expressed:
In this extended Country, embracing so great a diversity of interests, it
would be dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small number of members of the two Houses to make laws. The Central States could always
take care to be on the Spot and by meeting earlier than the distant ones,
or wearying their patience, and outstaying them, could carry such measures as they pleased.
Id.
110. See generally GARVEY, supra note 56.
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likely outcome is the Court’s finding of a nonjusticiable political question,111 but even an exhaustive review of remote voting rules in light
of the quorum requirement itself leads to the same likely conclusion: A
rule allowing for remote voting in Congress is constitutional.
E.

Other Considerations: The Use of Technology in
Constitutional Settings, Previous Actions To Address
Mass Vacancies in Congress, and Technological
Hurdles to Remote Voting

Although it has not done so in the remote voting context, the Supreme Court has not been shy to incorporate or apply new technology
to existing constitutional standards. Some of the most high-profile
cases in this context involve the Fourth Amendment as it relates to
unreasonable searches.
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that the use of thermal
imaging technology to explore details of a home from outside constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes and therefore required a search warrant.112 The majority reasoned “[t]he Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and
rights of individual citizens.”113 Because the government used the
thermal imaging device to collect details about an individual’s home
that “would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion,” use of the device was a search and therefore “presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”114
The same logic can be applied to the quorum requirement. At the
time the Constitution was adopted, the only means by which Congress
could gather the required number of members to satisfy the quorum
requirement was an in-person gathering. Similarly, at the time of its
writing, the Fourth Amendment’s ban of unreasonable searches necessarily contemplated a physical presence. But Kyllo exemplifies that
physical presence can be incidental when, as the Court stresses in
Kyllo, the impermissible search—peering into a home to gather information—is the same whether accomplished by physically entering the
space or using technology. By analogy, access to the legislative process—the quorum—is the same whether members are physically at
the Capitol Building or present via technology. The important aspect
of the requirement is the gathering, not the in-person aspect. There is
111.
112.
113.
114.

See supra section III.C.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
Id.; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment draws a “firm line at the entrance to the house”).
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no constitutional hurdle in using technology to accomplish an end that
was unimaginable at the time the framers wrote the Constitution.
The Court has also embraced evolving technology in the Commerce
Clause115 context. In 1967, the Court held that, under the dormant
Commerce Clause, it was unconstitutional for states to impose use
taxes on out-of-state mail order firms with no retail outlet in the
state.116 In Bellas Hess, the Court found that unless a seller maintained a physical presence such as “retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a [s]tate,” the state lacked the power to levy local use taxes
on the retailer.117 The Court’s ruling rested not only on the retailer
having the requisite contacts under the Commerce Clause, but also on
due process grounds.118 The Court re-examined the Bellas Hess holdings in Quill v. North Dakota.119 Although the Court in Quill overruled the Bellas Hess due process holding, it did not overrule its
interpretation of the “substantial nexus” required under the Commerce Clause and thus affirmed the physical presence rule.120 The
Court grounded its decision in the logic that physical presence is necessary to create a “substantial nexus” between the taxing state and
the retailer.121 Writing for the majority in Quill, Justice Stevens invited Congress to disagree with the Court’s conclusion and intervene if
necessary.122
In 2018, the Court overruled Quill’s physical presence rule in
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.123 The respondents in Wayfair were a
group of online merchants with no employees or real estate in South
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes”).
116. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled by
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), and South Dakota v. Wayfair,
138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). The Court in Bellas Hess noted:
In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens on
National in this case, we would have to repudiate totally the sharp distinction which these and other decisions have drawn between mail order
sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and
those who do no more than communicate with customers in the State by
mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business.
Id. at 758.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 298.
120. Id. at 307–08.
121. Id. at 311; see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)
(holding that a state tax will survive a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the
“tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is
fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is
fairly related to the services provided by the State”).
122. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318.
123. 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
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Dakota.124 The state enacted a law requiring “out-of-state sellers to
collect and remit sales tax ‘as if the seller had a physical presence in
the state.’ ”125 In acknowledging the physical presence rule was “unsound and incorrect,”126 the Court held that a substantial nexus was
established “when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.”127
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted:
The “dramatic technological and social changes” of our “increasingly interconnected economy” mean that buyers are “closer to most major retailers” than
ever before—“regardless of how close or far the nearest storefront.” Between
targeted advertising and instant access to most consumers via any internetenabled device, “a business may be present in a State in a meaningful way
without” that presence “being physical in the traditional sense of the term.” A
virtual showroom can show far more inventory, in far more detail, and with
greater opportunities for consumer and seller interaction than might be possible for local stores. Yet the continuous and pervasive virtual presence of retailers today is, under Quill, simply irrelevant. This Court should not
maintain a rule that ignores these substantial virtual connections to the
State.128

Although Wayfair overturned a judicially-created rule and did not directly interpret a constitutional provision, Justice Kennedy’s reasoning applies equally well to implementing remote voting. Just as “ ‘a
business may be present in a state in a meaningful way without’ that
presence ‘being physical in the traditional sense of the term,’ ”129 with
today’s technology, presence for quorum and voting purposes can be
just as meaningful virtually as physically.
Wayfair also illustrates an efficiency argument for remote voting.
At the time Wayfair was decided, it was estimated that the Quill physical presence rule cost states between $8 and $33 billion every year in
lost tax revenues.130 Although exact figures are difficult to extrapolate, the time and efficiency gained from not having members of Congress traveling to Washington D.C. during emergency situations
would likely be significant.
The COVID-19 outbreak is not the first time the House has contemplated a remote voting system. Following the terrorist attacks on
124. Id. at 2089. The plaintiffs were Wayfair, Inc., Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg,
Inc. Wayfair, Inc. alone had net revenues of over $4.7 billion in 2017. Id.
125. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2016)).
126. Id. at 2099.
127. Id. (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)).
128. Id. at 2095 (quoting Direct Mktg. Assn. v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
129. Id. (quoting Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 575 U.S. at 18 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
130. See id. at 2088. The physical presence rule necessitated states relying on consumers to pay the use tax owed on online purchases, which was impractical. Consumer compliance rates were low, with one estimate as low as four percent. The
South Dakota Department of Revenue estimated the state lost $48–$58 million
annually. Id.
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September 11, 2001, “Congress spent substantial time reviewing the
possibilities of establishing a remote voting system.”131 The effort ultimately failed in part due to lack of “[c]ongressional or public support
to make the difficult decisions and investments needed to address
challenging questions that were identified.”132
Of course, the prospect of incorporating remote voting also poses
significant technology and security concerns. As a recent study by the
House Rules Committee noted, the existing closed electronic voting
system required over fifty bills and resolutions and 100 years to put
into place in 1970.133 Due to the threat of cyber-attacks or interference by third parties and the challenges of identification and authentication, such a system could not be put in place overnight.134 The
House report also notes the importance of a secure deliberation space
apart from the influence of potential bad actors as a concern.135 The
House report also cites examples of technology failures in a voting context as cautionary tales of implementing a new system, including the
2020 Iowa Caucus failures and 2007 failure of the in-person electronic
voting system on the House floor.136 While these challenges are real
and significant, the presumption is they are surmountable with sufficient time and resources. Therefore, they will not be considered in
depth here.
IV. EXECUTION: SETTING CHAMBER RULES TO ALLOW FOR
REMOTE VOTING
The current rules of the House allow for the use of an in-person
electronic voting system.137 Members of the House have a minimum of
fifteen minutes to record their vote.138 As of this writing, the House
resolution allowing for proxy voting requires reauthorization in August 2021 and presents an opportunity to further amend chamber
rules to allow for direct remote voting.139 Senate rules still require the
more traditional roll call voting.140
Representative Eric Swalwell introduced the Members Operating
to Be Innovative and Link Everyone Resolution (MOBILE Resolution),
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON RULES, supra note 50, at 12.
Id. at 7.
See id. at 7–11.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8–9.
See H.R. DOC. NO. 115–177, at 844 (2019) (House Rule XX(2)(a) provides “[u]nless
the Speaker directs otherwise, the Clerk shall conduct a record vote or quorum
call by electronic device”).
138. Id.
139. See Fandos, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
140. See S. DOC. NO. 113–118, at 8 (2013).
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in an attempt to authorize remote voting.141 The resolution called for
the House to amend Rule XI to allow for participation of absent members in committee hearings, as well as for members to vote remotely
on suspension motions.142 Both portions of the resolution included
language allowing members casting a vote with a remote voting system to be treated as present for quorum purposes.143 For committee
purposes, the resolution simply called for members to be allowed to
participate and vote by using “video conferencing and related technologies.”144 However, for remote votes to be cast on motions to suspend
the rules, the resolution stated that the “Clerk, Chief Administrative
Officer, and Sergeant at Arms shall work together to develop and implement a secure remote voting system under which any member who
is absent from the floor shall be permitted to cast a vote remotely . . . if
the vote is taken by electronic device.”145 The resolution was referred
to the House Committee on Rules without any further action.146
Senator Rob Portman introduced a similar resolution in the Senate, calling for an amendment to the rules allowing for remote participation of absent senators during a national crisis.147 The Senate
resolution would require an agreement between the majority and minority leaders “that an extraordinary crisis of national extent exists in
which it would be infeasible for senators to cast their votes in person.”148 The senators could then cast their votes by technological
means approved by the Secretary of the Senate, Sergeant at Arms,
and Director of the Doorkeepers for thirty days.149 A vote of threefifths of senators “duly chosen and sworn” could extend the period beyond the initial thirty days.150 The resolution also included language
allowing for senators casting remote votes to be counted for quorum
purposes.151
141. MOBILE Resolution, H.R. 890, 116th Cong. (2020) (“Amending the Rules of the
House of Representatives to permit absent Members to participate in committee
hearings using video conferencing and related technologies and to establish a remote voting system under which absent Members may cast votes in the House on
motions to suspend the rules.”)
142. Id. §§ 2–3.
143. Id.
144. Id. § 2(a).
145. Id. § 3.
146. All Actions Except Amendments H.Res.890, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/890/all-actions-without-amendments
?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22remotevoting%5C%22%22%5D%7D
[https://perma.cc/86Q7-CESH] (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
147. S. 548, 116th Cong. (2020).
148. Id. § 1.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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Much like the House resolution, the Senate resolution was referred
to the Committee on Rules and Administration, where no further action was taken.152 Despite the appearance of bi-partisan support,153
the resolution faced opposition from Rules Committee Chairman Roy
Blunt and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell.154
The most effective solution to modifying the rules to allow for remote voting would simply be for each house to consider adopting one
of the existing resolutions. Both would accomplish the goal of allowing
members to cast their votes and participate remotely.
V. REMOTE VOTING IN THE NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE IS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED
A.

Survey of Remote Voting at the State Level

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, at
least thirty-six states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto Rico
have considered or adopted bills or resolutions relating to legislative
operations in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, including bills or
resolutions for remote participation and voting.155 The range of provi152. All Actions S.Res.548, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/
senate-resolution/548/all-actions?r=15&overview=closed&s=8#tabs [https://
perma.cc/YS8G-QFP4] (last visted Sept. 20, 2020).
153. Cosponsors: S.Res.548, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/
senate-resolution/548/cosponsors?r=15&s=8&searchResultViewType=expanded
[https://perma.cc/2DTJ-FSKE] (last visited Sept. 20, 2020) (setting forth that the
bill was co-sponsored by seven Democrats, two Independents, and seven
Republicans).
154. See Melissa Quinn & Alan He, Remote Voting Gains Traction in Senate After
House Coronavirus Diagnoses, CBS NEWS (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:47 PM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/remote-voting-gains-traction-in-senate-after-housecoronavirus-diagnoses/ [https://perma.cc/6R8Y-TUND]. Senator Roy Blunt was
quoted as saying: “Not gonna happen . . . . The speaker doesn’t want to do it, the
leader doesn’t want to do it. It’s not going to happen.” Senator Mitch McConnell
told reporters “that senators would adapt to new guidelines for dealing with the
coronavirus ‘without fundamentally changing the Senate rules.’ ” Other Senators
expressed far more support for the measure. Senator Amy Klobuchar, the top
Democrat on the Rules Committee, stated:
The Senate must do its job to protect the American people from the
health and economic impacts of this pandemic. That means we need updated emergency plans including remote Senate voting to ensure that we
can pass legislation during any crisis . . . . As ranking member of the
Rules Committee, I commend Senators Durbin and Portman for their
work on this proposal, and I will continue working with them to pass
their bill to ensure our continuity plans address the reality of new
threats.
Id.
155. COVID-19: State Actions Related to Legislative Operations, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/covid-19state-actions-related-to-legislative-operations.aspx [https://perma.cc/5J8G-8RS9]
(Mar. 30, 2021).
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sions has varied significantly from state to state.156 For example,
Utah adopted wide-ranging electronic meeting rules that allow the
legislature to conduct electronic sessions and meetings under certain
circumstances.157 New Jersey adopted similar provisions allowing for
the conduct of state business and legislative sessions by electronic
means.158 Other states, such as Oregon, attempted but failed to pass
state constitutional amendments to allow remote participation.159 So
far, Nebraska is not among the states that have formally introduced
measures allowing for remote legislative participation or voting.160
B.

Remote Voting in Nebraska: Constitutional
Considerations

Despite a lack of action, there have been calls for the Nebraska
Legislature to adopt remote voting mechanisms in the wake of the
COVID-19 outbreak. Following the legislature suspending its session
in March 2020 in light of COVID-19 concerns,161 State Senator Patty
Pansing Brooks sent an email and memorandum to fellow legislators
advocating for and addressing the constitutionality of remote voting.162 In the memorandum, Pansing Brooks noted:
I do not believe we are required to be together to vote, especially during states
of emergency. I believe we could access an electronic system . . . where we
could meet virtually as a Legislature, hear discussions, vote publicly, have it
156. See id.
157. Id.; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 1-4-401 (LexisNexis 2020) (allowing for the president
of the senate or speaker of the house to call for electronic sessions for a wide
range of legislative sessions and meetings provided certain circumstances are
present).
158. COVID-19: State Actions Related to Legislative Operations, supra note 155; see
N.J. REV. STAT § 52:1-1 (2020).
159. COVID-19: State Actions Related to Legislative Operations, supra note 155; see
S.J. Res. 201, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2020).
160. COVID-19: State Actions Related to Legislative Operations, supra note 155.
161. Martha Stoddard, Nebraska Legislature Suspends Session Because of
Coronavirus Concerns, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Mar. 16, 2020), https://
omaha.com/livewellnebraska/health/nebraska-legislature-suspends-session-because-of-coronavirus-concerns/article_c4d92fd5-4112-5c62-a15b-2e5
fa86f0935.html?utm_medium=social&utm_source=email&utm_campaign=usershare [https://perma.cc/6K7X-9CYP] (“We have made this decision primarily for
the health and safety of the state and to protect the health of the members in the
body . . . .”).
162. Martha Stoddard, Nebraska Legislature To Reconvene Monday, One Senator
Calls Virtual Meeting, SCOTTSBLUFF STAR-HERALD (Mar. 22, 2020), https://
starherald.com/news/regional_statewide/nebraska-legislature-to-reconvene-monday-one-senator-calls-virtual-meeting/article_45fe8e1d-ecb3-538c-aa3c0282b97d4a98.html [https://perma.cc/3Q9E-Y4UZ] (“Can any one of us be reasonably assured that we will not infect a colleague, and thereby their family, or be
infected by a colleague and thereby infect our family, with this rash assembly,
which could be quickly replaced by remote technology?” (quoting Pansing
Brooks)).
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recorded in the Journal, live stream it and have it broadcast by NET [Nebraska Public Media]. With our 21st Century technology, we could reconvene
electronically, as quickly as in person, perhaps even more quickly.163

She concluded the Nebraska constitution did not provide any barriers to remote voting.164
In a follow up memorandum, Pansing Brooks proposed changes to
existing legislative rules to allow for remote voting.165 She also identified several rules that contemplated physical presence in the chamber
and noted that such rules would have to be suspended or subordinated
to new emergency rules.166
The legislature would meet for just three days following its initial
suspension in March before finally reconvening in late July.167 A
small group of senators on the rules committee met virtually to discuss remote voting and participation options, with no final action
taken.168
There are several provisions in the Constitution of the State of Nebraska that could impact the constitutionality of remote voting. For
instance, Article III-10 lays out the state’s quorum requirement and
prescribes the legislative rulemaking power: “A majority of the members elected to the Legislature shall constitute a quorum; the Legislature shall determine the rules of its proceedings and be the judge of
the election, returns, and qualifications of its members.”169 Article III11 provides that all votes must be taken viva voce (oral, rather than
written), that the doors of the legislature shall be open except when
the business need be secret, and that the yeas and nays should be
recorded in the journal.170
163. Memorandum from Patty Pansing Brooks, Neb. State Sen., to Nebraska Legislature on Constitutional Requirements for How Legislators Vote in Nebraska Legislature Re COVID-19 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/
track?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:ed150159-7e41-4f71-b4c5-5fba28571fd4#pageNum=1
[https://perma.cc/9295-UC7V] (regarding constitutional requirements for how
legislators vote in Nebraska Legislature during COVID-19).
164. Id. at 1 (“There is no provision in the Nebraska Constitution that requires that
members must be present in the Legislative Chamber to vote, or present with
each other for that matter. The votes must be public and recorded in the Journal.
Period.”).
165. Memorandum from Sen. Patty Pansing Brooks to Sen. Jim Scheer et al. (May 20,
2020) (on file with author).
166. Id. at 8–9 (noting several rules—including one that provides “[o]nly senators
physically in the legislative chamber may vote”—would need to be suspended or
superseded despite seeming to contradict other rules).
167. See JoAnne Young, State Senators Consider Remote Meeting, Voting Options for
this Month’s Session, LINCOLN J. STAR (Aug. 13, 2020), https://journalstar.com/
legislature/state-senators-consider-remote-meeting-voting-options-for-thismonths-session/article_a9e3ece3-9ab4-562e-87b2-51e710e662b6.html [https://
perma.cc/E8CU-ZW4U].
168. Id.
169. NEB. CONST. art. III-10.
170. NEB. CONST. art III-11:
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The strongest—and perhaps most definitive—authority on legislative voting matters in Nebraska is Day v. Walker, in which the court
contemplated the constitutionality of the electronic roll call system in
the legislature.171 The primary challenge was that pressing an electronic button (yea, nay, not voting) installed at each desk did not
amount to voting viva voce as the constitution required.172
In upholding the use of the electronic roll call system as constitutional, the Supreme Court of Nebraska took a broad interpretive view,
finding that “[i]n interpreting a constitutional provision, the language
used therein must be taken as having been designed to meet the needs
of a progressive society, and should not be strictly confined to its
meaning as understood at the time the instrument was adopted.”173
On the importance of maintaining flexibility during emergencies, the
court noted: “Constitutions are not made for existing conditions only,
nor in the view that the state of society will not advance or improve,
but for future emergencies and conditions, and their terms and provisions are constantly expanded and enlarged by construction to meet
the advancing and improving affairs of men.”174
The court went on to hold that the viva voce provision in the constitution was aimed simply at giving publicity to votes—as opposed to
casting secret written ballots—and that the electronic roll call system
provided that publicity.175 So long as the votes were properly recorded
in the journal, there could be no challenge to a bill’s passage.176 Perhaps even more critically, the court closed its analysis by holding:
[T]he question of whether they should resort to the electric roll call system, or
the old-style viva voce voting, is a question entirely within the discretion of the
legislative bodies. So long as the system used gives publicity to the member’s
vote, and his yea or nay vote is properly recorded on the journal, no other
requirement in that respect is necessary.177

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings and publish them,
except such parts as may require secrecy, and the yeas and nays of the
members on any question shall at the desire of any one of them be entered on the journal. All votes shall be viva voce. The doors of the Legislature and of the committees of the Legislature shall be open, except
when the business shall be such as ought to be kept secret. The yeas and
nays of each member of any committee of the Legislature shall be recorded and published on any question in committee to advance or to indefinitely postpone any bill.
124 Neb. 500, 500–02, 247 N.W. 350, 350–51 (1933).
Id.
Id. at 505, 247 N.W. at 352 (citing State v. Keating, 173 P. 1156, 1158 (Mont.
1917)).
Id. at 504, 247 N.W. at 352 (emphasis added) (citing Elwell v. Comstock, 109
N.W. 698, 699 (Minn. 1906)).
Id. at 506, 247 N.W. at 353.
Id.
Id. at 506, 247 N.W. at 352–53.
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In the context of remote voting, the explicit holding in Day seems to
settle the issue of constitutionality. So long as whatever remote system used (1) gives proper publicity to the members’ votes, and (2) the
yea or nay votes are properly recorded in the legislative journal,178
then no other requirement is necessary.179 The question seems to become one of designing and implementing the appropriate technology,
as opposed to one of constitutionality. While there may be potential
statutory or legislative rules to overcome—which will not be discussed
in detail here—remote voting in Nebraska does not seem to face any
constitutional barriers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the wake of COVID-19 and with potential unknown threats always lurking in the background, both Congress180 and the Nebraska
Legislature181 should heed the opportunity to enact measures allowing remote legislative participation and voting. At the federal
level, the Court’s decision in Ballin gives Congress wide authority and
discretion to determine its own rules, save for those that violate constitutional restraints.182 Ultimately, the Court would likely reject a
challenge to congressional rulemaking power on political question
grounds.183 Even if the Court decided to ignore the political question
doctrine and embark on a Ballin-like analysis, the text of the Constitution does not appear to provide any express limitations on the
rulemaking power in the remote voting context.184 Further, the Court
has been receptive to changes in technology in a variety of cases, including those involving the Fourth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause.185
The path to implementing remote voting in Nebraska faces fewer
constitutional hurdles than at the federal level. The Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding in Day seemingly settles the constitutional issue and leaves it to the legislature to suspend or change the rules as it
sees fit.186
178. See also State v. Abbott, 59 Neb. 106, 106, 80 N.W. 499, 500 (1899) (finding the
legislative journals are the official records of the proceedings relative to the enactment of laws and are the only competent evidence in regard to the passage of a
bill).
179. This is not to say that there are not other potential challenges, such as security
and technology. See supra section III.E.
180. See supra Part III.
181. See supra Part V.
182. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
183. See supra section III.C.
184. See supra section III.D.
185. See supra section III.E.
186. See supra section V.B.
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Despite practical, albeit surmountable, challenges to remote voting, there are no detrimental or dispositive constitutional hurdles at
either the federal or state level standing in the way.

